

representatives," which was apparently intended to paper over differences between the sides as to how to deal with a "third force," failed to contain the government's strong objection in this regard.<sup>285</sup> Indeed, shortly before the end of the Tehran round on 19 January, a major rally occurred in Leninabad, demanding that the National Revival Bloc should be allowed to take part in the CNR.<sup>286</sup> Although the parties were unable to resolve the delicate issue of the composition of the CNR, they agreed on its size (fixed on 27 members but later reduced by one). Consensus was reached on the composition of the Central Electoral Commission, which was to be created by the CNR for the transition period; 25 percent of its members would be recruited from the UTO.<sup>287</sup> Aided by the *facilitator* role played by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, the parties also finalised the Protocol on Refugee Issues, which was a less contentious document.<sup>288</sup>

In February the political climate was clouded by a serious hostage incident. The armed group led by Bakhrom Sodirov took hostage UN and Red Cross officials, Russian journalists, and the Tajik Security Minister, demanding the return from Afghanistan to Tajikistan of the rebel leader's brother, Rizvon, and his fighters. (Rizvon Sodirov, a former opposition commander who had gone over to the government side, had committed hostage-taking in December 1996 as well.) The UN suspended all activities in Tajikistan and evacuated its personnel to Uzbekistan. In the face of a threat to the peace process, Rakhmonov and Nuri collaborated in securing the release of the hostages, and once it was achieved by meeting the militants' demand, they went on to launch a joint military operation against Sodirov's group in an apparent attempt to deter future occurrence of a similar challenge by forces submissive neither to the Tajik government nor to the UTO. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Ignatenko *facilitated* the hostage

<sup>285</sup> Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mashhad, 12 January 1997 (BBC SWB, 14 January 1997); and *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 January 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 2, 12 February 1997, p. 20).

<sup>286</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/56, 21 January 1997; and Russia TV channel, Moscow, 18 January 1997 (BBC SWB, 21 January 1997). The protesters called for a 30 percent share of seats for the National Revival Bloc. See *Segodnya*, 21 January 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 3, 19 February 1997, p. 21).

<sup>287</sup> The joint statement on the results of the Tehran talks is found in Annex IV to UNSG Report, S/1997/56, 21 January 1997.

<sup>288</sup> Hay, "Methodology," p. 40. The text of the protocol is published in Annex III to UNSG Report, S/1997/56, 21 January 1997.



release by making contacts with Sodirov. Also instrumental was Afghan commander Ahmed Shah Massoud who controlled the part of northern Afghanistan in which Sodirov's fighters were located.<sup>289</sup>

Meanwhile, in an effort to remove major obstacles to settlement of their own conflict, Rakhmonov and Nuri again got personally involved in the negotiations. Their meeting in Mashhad, Iran, on 20–21 February produced the statute of the CNR, which included provisions on its composition and structure. The CNR would consist of equivalent numbers of government and UTO representatives, leaving no seats for other Tajik parties. The two leaders also agreed that the UTO would be included in 30 percent of executive branch posts in the government. (They concluded an additional protocol to modify the provision of the original December 1996 protocol stipulating that the UTO was to gain the identical percentage share in the government and the CNR.) As for the structure, the CNR would establish four sub-commissions (on political, military, refugee, and legal issues).<sup>290</sup> Indeed, the Inter-Tajik Dialogue might have played the *envisioner's* role in this regard. In its first memorandum published in March 1994, the Dialogue had proposed the formation of the same number of working groups to deal with such practical problems as refugee return, political reform, disarmament, and economic development.<sup>291</sup>

*Reiterated*

The parties took further steps toward each other, shifting the negotiation agenda from political coexistence to military integration. On 26 February Russian and UN mediators *convened* the Moscow (seventh) round of inter-Tajik talks and *facilitated* the two sides' negotiations on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of the UTO forces into

<sup>289</sup> *Kommersant-Daily*, 6 February 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 6, 12 March 1997, p. 17); *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 February 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 7, 19 March 1997, p. 24); and UNSG Report, S/1997/198, 5 March 1997 and S/1997/415, 30 May 1997.

<sup>290</sup> Interfax, 22 February 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis); and UNSG Report, S/1997/198, 5 March 1997. The texts of the statute of the CNR and the additional protocol are found in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, pp. 71–72.

<sup>291</sup> Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, p. 163; Saunders, "The Multilevel Peace Process," p. 172; and Slim and Saunders, "The Inter-Tajik Dialogue," p. 46. For the text of "Memorandum on the Negotiation Process in Tajikistan, 4 March 1994," see Chufrin et al., eds., *Memoranda and Appeals*, pp. 83–85.



the government power structures as well as on reform of those structures. As is often the case with negotiations to end internal conflict, the formation of a unified national army proved to be an extremely thorny question. The government side represented by Nazarov started with the proposal that armed opposition units should first lay down their arms, disband and then merge into the country's regular armed forces in small groups of about 5 to 15 men. In contrast, the opposition proposal presented by Turajonzoda was that opposition fighters should initially join the government's power structures unit by unit (retaining battalion and company divisions) and be stationed separately but under a single command.<sup>292</sup> To put it differently, the government called for total disarmament and disbandment of the UTO forces for fear that the opposition's idea should create "two parallel military structures," allowing the opposition to keep and use their own to seize power in the future. The opposition, on the other hand, demanded gradual reintegration, claiming that the government's scheme would cause "psychological incompatibility between former adversaries."<sup>293</sup> Negotiations went sour because of not only the wide gap between the parties' positions on this substantive issue but also an adjournment demanded by the opposition in protest against the detention of several of its members by the Dushanbe government on charges of "terrorist activities" (the killing of Russian servicemen).<sup>294</sup>

But with the help of mediators, the sides managed to sign the Protocol on Military Issues on 8 March. While Merrem enacted the *envisioner* role to work out a compromise formula,<sup>295</sup> Primakov and his deputy, Pastukhov, acted in the role of *inducer* to convince the parties to arrive at an agreement.<sup>296</sup> Primakov described the conclusion of the agreement as "a success for Russian diplomacy." The foreign minister responded positively to the parties' request for the fulfilment of the *enforcer* role by Russia, pledging that it, as one of the observer countries, will "directly participate in

<sup>292</sup> Ekho Moskvyy radio, Moscow, 28 February 1997 (BBC SWB, 4 March 1997); and Interfax, 1 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>293</sup> Interfax, 1 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>294</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/198, 5 March 1997 and S/1997/415, 30 May 1997; and Interfax, 3 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>295</sup> Interfax, 2 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>296</sup> Hay, "Methodology," p. 40.



putting the document into effect" and "do everything in its power to ensure the document is implemented."<sup>297</sup> Under the protocol, the reintegration of UTO armed forces was to be a gradual process, consisting of four stages: disarmament at the designated assembly points (first stage); incorporation into the country's regular armed forces as separate units and being subordinated to corresponding chains of command as well as the public announcement of disbandment by the UTO leadership (second stage); Suitability screening for individual members of the UTO armed units by the newly-created Joint Review Board (third stage); and the complete merger (fourth stage).<sup>298</sup>

Increasingly concerned over the prospect of the Taliban's renewed spring offensive in Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian states strengthened their enactment of an *inducer* role, pressing harder for rapid termination of the conflict in Tajikistan. At the CIS summit meeting in Moscow on 28 March, the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan was extended until the end of the year and the facilitation of peacemaking efforts there was agreed upon.<sup>299</sup> On 5 April the foreign ministers of the four Central Asian states and Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Pastukhov gathered in Dushanbe to discuss developments in Afghanistan. On this occasion the foreign ministers endorsed the proposal that Rakhmonov and Nuri should ultimately meet in Moscow in order to sign a final peace agreement. At the same time they acted as an *enforcer*, urging the Tajik parties to strictly abide by the agreements achieved so far.<sup>300</sup> In reaction, Rakhmonov, while voicing grave concern at the Afghan conflict and calling for intensified international efforts to settle it, described the peace process in his own country as "irreversible," saying that "there is no reasonable alternative to the Tajik

<sup>297</sup> *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 March 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 10, 9 April 1997, p. 20); Interfax, 8 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis); and ITAR-TASS, 9 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis). During the course of the negotiation of the protocol, Achakhmat Chekunov, the first secretary of the Third Department of Asia of Russian Foreign Ministry, gave his backing to the opposition's proposal for a gradual reintegration of the UTO armed forces into Tajikistan's power structures. See Interfax, 1 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>298</sup> The text of the protocol is found in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, pp. 73-74.

<sup>299</sup> Interfax, 28 March 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>300</sup> Khovar news agency, Dushanbe, 5 April 1997 (BBC SWB, 8 April 1997).



peace dialogue.”<sup>301</sup> In the face of a threatening scenario in Afghanistan, the Tajik leader himself was ready to accept as the fate of his regime what Central Asian neighbours and Russia had been seeking for in Tajikistan.

Yet the final (eighth) round of talks in Tehran came as a setback to the negotiation process. Immediately upon opening on 9 April, the negotiations were broken off by the opposition over the detention in Moscow of its supporters on suspicion of having been involved in “terrorism.” Mediators from Iran, which was a *convener* of the round, and Russia played the role of *inducer*, successfully talking the two sides into returning to the negotiating table. Then the parties dealt with such issues as the legalisation of opposition parties and the guarantees of implementation of their agreements. Especially as regards the first issue, differences emerged between the sides on the timing of lifting the ban on opposition parties. The Dushanbe government proposed the legalisation of opposition parties six months after the creation of the CNR. The opposition side countered with a demand for its acquisition of a legal status at the same time as the CNR begins to function. Both sides rejected a three-month delay, a compromise proposal that Merrem put forward in the *envisioner* role. On the back of the lingering tension due to the issue of “terrorism,” the talks became stalled over this and other disagreements, leading the opposition to suspend the round again on 16 April.<sup>302</sup>

As the negotiation process had clearly reached a deadlock, Russia moved to enact the role of *inducer* to keep it going. Yeltsin received Rakhmonov in Moscow and confirmed his support for the Tajik government’s policy of seeking the settlement of the conflict with the opposition. Concurrently, however, Yeltsin reminded Rakhmonov of “the importance of a consistent progress” in moving in that direction.<sup>303</sup> In the meantime, two disturbing incidents took place in the Leninabad region. In mid April the government cracked down on a prison riot there and killed a sizeable number of

<sup>301</sup> Interfax, 5 April 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>302</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/415, 30 May 1997; ITAR-TASS, 10 and 18 April 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis); Interfax, 15 and 16 April 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis); and Voice of Free Tajikistan, 17 April 1997 (BBC SWB, 19 April 1997).

<sup>303</sup> ITAR-TASS, 24 April 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).



prisoners, many of whom had taken part in the May 1996 demonstrations.<sup>304</sup> On 30 April, during his visit to the region, Rakhmonov survived an assassination attempt, which he described as a mere criminal act rather than a politically motivated attack. The UTO denied involvement in the attempt and condemned it.<sup>305</sup> Abdullajanov's National Revival Bloc, a more natural suspect by virtue of its regional agenda, also denied any link with the attempt.<sup>306</sup>

In danger of letting the momentum slip away, Rakhmonov and Nuri held a face-to-face meeting on 16–18 May in Kyrgyzstan. They succeeded in removing major stumbling blocks and drawing up the Protocol on Political Issues and the Bishkek Memorandum.<sup>307</sup> The protocol settled the question of legalising UTO parties and movements, and liberalising mass media by linking them to the implementation of the military protocol. The government's negotiating position was that the legalisation of the opposition parties would come only after the disarmament of UTO military forces, which was rejected by the opposition side. Not surprisingly, the government wanted to make the adversary powerless militarily before allowing it to become a legitimate contestant politically. The opposition, on the other hand, sought to make sure that it would be a viable participant in normal politics when giving up a military means of struggle. The compromise reached by the two leaders was that the government would lift the restrictions on the opposition parties and media following the implementation of the second phase of the military protocol and that they would operate within the country's constitutional and legal framework.<sup>308</sup> In the memorandum, Rakhmonov and Nuri agreed on the strength of UTO personnel to be stationed in Dushanbe to protect opposition CNR members (460 armed units and 40 guards). They also agreed that the CNR would start to function immediately after the conclusion of a final peace

<sup>304</sup> Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, p. 86; and Interfax, 21 April 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>305</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/415, 30 May 1997; and ITAR-TASS, 30 April 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>306</sup> ITAR-TASS, 2 May 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis). But Abdullajanov did not rule out a connection with the preceding prison riot. See ITAR-TASS, 30 April 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>307</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/415, 30 May 1997.

<sup>308</sup> The text of the protocol is found in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, pp. 74–75; and Voice of Free Tajikistan, 15 May 1997 (BBC SWB, 17 May 1997).



agreement.<sup>309</sup> Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and Merrem acted as a *convener* and *facilitator*, making a significant contribution to the signing of the political protocol and the memorandum.<sup>310</sup>

Cleared by these top-level agreements in Bishkek, the Tehran (eighth) round of talks resumed on 22 May and led to the signing on 28 May of the Protocol on the Guarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. Constituting the last of those individual protocols that the parties had agreed to work out in the August 1995 Protocol on the Fundamental Principles, the Protocol on the Guarantees provided for the roles of the UN and observer countries as a *monitor* and *enforcer* of all the agreements achieved so far. In order to fulfil those roles, the UN was called upon to enlarge the mandate of the UNMOT and the observer states were asked to establish a Dushanbe-based Contact Group, together with the UN, the OSCE, and the OIC.<sup>311</sup> Although the parties agreed on the arrangements for political guarantees, they differed over ways to buttress their agreements in military terms. The opposition side insisted that the protocol should provide for the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping forces and their replacement by UN peacekeeping forces to be composed of contingents from the observer countries, not least Iran and Pakistan. But the government's delegation flatly rejected these proposals on the grounds that the issue of the CIS peacekeeping forces fell outside the jurisdiction of negotiators at the inter-Tajik talks.<sup>312</sup> Thus the presence of the CIS peacekeeping forces was to remain as a major vehicle for ensuring the military stability necessary for the implementation of the agreements.

<sup>309</sup> The text of the memorandum is found in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, p. 75.

<sup>310</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/415, 30 May 1997; Hay, "Methodology," p. 40; *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 20 May 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 20, 18 June 1997, p. 19); and ITAR-TASS, 18 May 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>311</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/415, 30 May 1997. The text of the protocol is found in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, pp. 75–76.

<sup>312</sup> Interfax, 24 May 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis); and Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mashhad, 25 May 1997 (BBC SWB, 28 May 1997). See also the Tehran Declaration of 28 May 1997, found in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, p. 77.



Significantly, the Tajik peace process became more and more closely intertwined with the turn of events in Afghanistan. The Taliban's takeover of Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan in May came as a serious threat to Russia (and Central Asian states) and further pushed them to try to end the conflict in Tajikistan.<sup>313</sup> For example, First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned against "an evident threat of the Afghan conflict overflowing into Tajikistan" and stated that "Russian peacemaking [in Tajikistan] is a necessary condition for preventing a domino effect throughout Central Asia."<sup>314</sup> Reflecting increasing concern on the part of the Russians, the 201st Division stationed in Tajikistan, which was the primary component of the CIS peacekeeping forces in the country, was placed on full alert.<sup>315</sup>

In anticipation of the conclusion of a final peace agreement in mid-June, the opposition made yet another attempt to extract possible compromises from the government. It demanded that prior to the signing ceremony in Moscow, prisoners of war should be exchanged between the sides and details on their power-sharing in executive structures should be worked out. While the peace process was being delayed by the opposition's last-ditch demands,<sup>316</sup> it came to be threatened by those who deemed a rapprochement between the government and the opposition to be undesirable. Forces loyal to Colonel Khudoiberdyev, the originally pro-government but repeatedly rebellious commander, moved to seize a strategic mountain pass near Dushanbe in a bid to obstruct the forthcoming return of opposition troops from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, thus defying the terms of agreement in the military protocol. Khudoiberdyev also insisted on a change of governors of the Khatlon province, which Kurgan-Tyube, his stronghold, had merged with Kulyab to form in 1992.<sup>317</sup> This challenge by Khudoiberdyev augured ill

<sup>313</sup> ITAR-TASS, 24 May 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>314</sup> Interfax, 26 May 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis). Of course, this concern was shared by the Tajik government. For a statement to this effect made by Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov, the government's chief negotiator at the resumed round of the Tehran talks, see Interfax, 25 May 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis).

<sup>315</sup> Radio Russia, Moscow, 26 May 1997 (BBC SWB, 27 May 1997).

<sup>316</sup> Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mashhad, 3 June 1997 (BBC SWB, 5 June 1997); and Voice of Free Tajikistan, 21 June 1997 (BBC SWB, 24 June 1997).

<sup>317</sup> Interfax, 17 June 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis); and Voice of Free Tajikistan, 18 June 1997 (BBC SWB, 19 June 1997).



for the future sustainability of the peace that was about to be achieved.

With the opposition's demands unfulfilled<sup>318</sup> and the rebellion unsuppressed,<sup>319</sup> Rakhmonov and Nuri went on to sign the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan on 27 June in Moscow.<sup>320</sup> The two leaders signified the negotiated settlement of the Tajik conflict in the presence of Russian President Yeltsin, a *convener* of the summit. While the Tajik leaders expressed their gratitude to the "decisive contribution of Russia and President Yeltsin personally" to achieving the settlement, Yeltsin declared the end of "one of the most prolonged and fierce conflicts in the former Soviet Union" and reiterated Russia's commitment to making that settlement sustainable.<sup>321</sup> Also present at the summit were foreign ministers of the observer countries, as well as Merrem and other representatives of the UN, the OSCE, and the OIC. These outside actors jointly enacted the role of *legitimiser* ceremonially and symbolically, endorsing the outcome of inter-Tajik negotiations that had necessitated about three years.

### Section 3      Review of Third-Party Roles

The narrative of the inter-Tajik negotiations provided further support to the major argument of this book—the argument already backed by the examination of the prenegotiation in the preceding chapter—that a multiplicity of mediators were active at different points in the negotiation process continuing from April 1994 to June 1997, assuming a variety of third-party roles, which at times overlapped. With the help of

<sup>318</sup> *Kommersant-Daily*, 28 June 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 26, 30 July 1997, p. 16); and Interfax, 28 June 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis). The demand for a prisoner exchange was at least addressed as the parties agreed to exchange 50 persons from each side by 15 July. See the Protocol on Mutual Understanding of 27 June 1997, published in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, p. 78.

<sup>319</sup> *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 20 August 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 33, 17 September 1997, p. 9).

<sup>320</sup> UNSG Report, S/1997/686, 4 September 1997. The text of the General Agreement is found in Abdullaev and Barnes, eds., *Politics of Compromise*, p. 78.

<sup>321</sup> Interfax, 27 June 1997 (via Lexis-Nexis); and *Kommersant-Daily*, 28 June 1997 (CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 26, 30 July 1997, p. 16).



Table 3 at the end of the section, we could find several enduring patterns regarding the enactment of different intermediary roles as suggested by Mitchell, on the basis of which it would be possible to pose research questions about interaction and interconnectedness among those different third-party roles.

The inter-Tajik negotiation process was a series of rounds of negotiations, consultations, and summit meetings that lasted for about three years. The two essential third-party roles in keeping that process on were those of convener and facilitator—the roles that Mitchell suggested may be enacted by the same third parties. In the Tajik case, they were fulfilled by top leaders of observer states, together with Piriz-Ballon initially and later Merrem, representing the UN that sponsored the entire negotiation process. Piriz-Ballon and Merrem continued to chair the talks throughout the process, while the observer states reserved for themselves the opportunity to give inputs into the negotiation process by either hosting meetings or being present at them as part of the observer group when not acting as a host. Why did these two types of actors cooperate in convening and facilitating the talks? And what combined impact did their roles have in helping the Tajik parties to deal with mutual distrust and engage in productive negotiations?

As far as the observer states were concerned, they apparently differed among themselves in terms of policy interests in Tajikistan and the levels of commitment to the negotiated settlement of the conflict there. Why and how have they come to cooperate with each other in sustaining the settlement process, convening and hosting talks on their territory in rotation? What were the implications of embracing such a rotation procedure for the observer states and also for the Tajik parties?

Other important roles mainly played by the observer states and the UN mediators include those of legitimiser, envisioner, and inducer. It seems that the inter-Tajik negotiations were significantly bolstered by the legitimising effects that the involvement of these third parties jointly generated. They also provided ideas and proposals that the Tajik parties consulted in the course of producing agreements on various aspects of the



conflict, and occasionally they went as far as to induce the conflicting sides to take conciliatory actions or swallow difficult agreements. Thus one might want to ask: what were the contributions made by the UN mediation team and the observer states through their respective roles of legitimiser, envisioner, and inducer? How did those contributions combine with each other to produce an impact on the negotiation process?

No less important, it is clear that in spite of seemingly equal participation by the observer states in the negotiation process, some elements of unevenness are in evidence. Russia and Iran apparently remained leading players, especially during the latter phase of the negotiation process. They stood out from the rest not only in terms of the frequency of holding talks but also in the intensity of mediation roles. Their inducer roles were critical for establishing a ceasefire between the Tajik sides in September 1994 and later for maintaining it. Moreover, as the parties began to engage in serious negotiations over the issue of power sharing toward late 1995, it seems that the fulfilment of the inducer and envisioner roles by Russian and Iranian mediators became increasingly frequent and intensive. The questions that arise in this regard are: Why did Russia and Iran work together as they appear to have? And was there any complementarity between their roles?

What stands in contrast to the predominance of Russia and Iran is Uzbekistan's relatively minor role, most clearly indicated by its failure to host any talks or summits. This raises the questions of what position Uzbekistan took as to the political settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan and what forces led to the marginalisation of this Central Asian power in the Tajik peace process.

Also, we see very clearly that the UN mediators occupied a central place in the entire mediation process. In addition to the above-noted third party roles, they moved into the role of neutral messenger in-between rounds of negotiations, notably toward the end of 1994 and in the summer of 1995, in order to sustain momentum and keep the negotiation process up and running. The role of the UN as a coordinator of the mediation process appears to have been acknowledged by the Tajik parties and the



major third parties alike. Why was the UN accepted as such? And how did the UN mediators fulfil coordinating functions in a rather successful manner?

Related to this point, the presence of both the UN and the OSCE in a single conflict situation certainly deserves a focused examination. On the whole, the OSCE kept a low profile as a mediator, except when the matters of elections and constitution became the focus of the political process. How was it agreed upon by the two organisations that the UN would be a lead mediator and coordinator? Were there any benefits or problems arising from their parallel involvement?

Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Tehran in September 1994, its maintenance became a continuous subject of the negotiations between the sides. And two kinds of peacekeepers—the Russian/CIS peacekeeping forces that had already been operating in Tajikistan, and the UN military observers who arrived there toward the end of that year—came to share the interrelated roles of monitor, guarantor, and enforcer in helping to keep the ceasefire. How could we conceptualise the interconnection among them?

Obviously, Russian/CIS troops were the main force with the ability to affect the military balance in the country, as was indicated by the opposition's frequent demands on their neutrality and restraint. It may well be that this, in turn, apparently placed a constraint on the activities of the UNMOT. Did these two peacekeepers cooperate effectively? And what opportunities and problems did they face in dealing with each other?

As regards the involvement of the unofficial dialogue in the negotiation process, it had some sporadic inputs as an envisioner with regard to proposals over mechanisms for national reconciliation such as the consultative forum and the CNR. But it seems to have become less relevant to the official process than in the prenegotiation stage. Does this suggest that the unofficial dialogue changed its policy about ways to interact with the official actors, once the negotiations got started at the official level? How were the unofficial envisioner roles interconnected to the same roles of official kind, enacted by



mediators from the UN and the observer states?

Finally, looking at the entire settlement process, it is important to note that there seem to be two interrelated factors that led to a significant change in its pace and mode; Russia's policy change toward Tajikistan and the Taliban's rise in Afghanistan. From the beginning of 1996, Russia accelerated mediation efforts under the leadership of Foreign Minister Primakov and increased pressure on Rakhmonov. The capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September that year further added to the overall urgency of mediation initiatives. How did these two factors influence the way different peacemaking efforts interacted with each other and were coordinated by the hands of UN mediators?

The research questions posed so far will be addressed in the following analytical chapters. Among them, those related to the issues of cooperation and interconnectedness—why the major third parties cooperated with each other and how their intermediary roles were interconnected—will be the subject of Chapter 4. And those questions on the issue of coordination by the UN will go to the heart of Chapter 5.



Table 3. Intermediary Roles in Tajikistan (From April 1994 to June 1997)

	04/94 (First round in Moscow)	05/94	06/94 (Second round in Tehran)	07-8/94	09/94 (Consultative meeting in Tehran)	10-11/94 (Third Round in Islamabad)	11/94	12/94	12/94-04/95
Explorer (reassurer)									
Convener	Kozyrev; Piniz-Ballon		Iran; Piniz-Ballon		Velayati, Vaezi; Piniz-Ballon	Asef Ali (Pakistan); Piniz-Ballon			
Decoupler									
Unifier									
Enskiller		Inter-Tajik Dialogue X							
Facilitator	Kozyrev; Piniz-Ballon; [observers]; NGOs		Iran; Piniz-Ballon; [observers]		Velayati, Vaezi; Piniz-Ballon; Chernishev (Russia); [observers]	Asef Ali; Piniz-Ballon; [observers]	Shabestari (Iran); ICRC re prisoner exchange	UNMOT at joint monitoring commission	
Envisioner (fact finder)									Inter-Tajik Dialogue re CNR X
Enhancer	Russia; UN								
Legitimiser	UN; entire observer group		UN; entire observer group		UN; entire observer group	UN; entire observer group			
Monitor									
Guarantor								UNMOT	
Enforcer									
Reconciler		Inter-Tajik Dialogue X	Inter-Tajik Dialogue X		Inter-Tajik Dialogue X			Inter-Tajik Dialogue X	Inter-Tajik Dialogue X
Inducer				Boutros-Ghal; OSCE vis-à-vis Dushanbe	Velayati, Vaezi; Chernishev re ceasefire agreement	Pakistan; Iran re extension of ceasefire			Nazarbayev, Karimov; Akayev at Chimkent summit
Neutral messenger		Piniz-Ballon, Goulding re continuation of negotiation							Piniz-Ballon, Sommereyns, Goulding, Ajello (UN) re venue problem
Unofficial convener /facilitator		Inter-Tajik Dialogue (7th meeting) X	Inter-Tajik Dialogue (8th meeting) X		Inter-Tajik Dialogue (9th meeting) X			Inter-Tajik Dialogue (10th meeting) X	Inter-Tajik Dialogue (11th meeting) X



	04/95 (Consultative meeting in Moscow)	05/95 (Rakhmonov -Nuri summit in Kabul)	05-6/95 (Fourth round in Almaty)	06/95	07/95 (Rakhmonov -Nuri summit in Tehran)	08-10/95	11-12/95 (First phase of fifth round in Ashgabat)
Explorer (reassurer)							
Convener	Russia; Piriz-Ballon	Rabbani	Nazarbayev; Piriz-Ballon		Iran		Niyazov, Shikhmuradov (Turkmenistan); Piriz-Ballon
Decoupler							
Unifier							
Enskiller							
Facilitator	Russia; Piriz-Ballon; [observers]	Rabbani	Nazarbayev; Piriz-Ballon; [observers]		Iran re consultative forum		Niyazov, Shikhmuradov; Piriz-Ballon; [observers]
Envisioner (fact finder)			Nazarbayev; Piriz-Ballon re power sharing formulas	Inter-Tajik Dialogue re consultative forum, CNR X		Piriz-Ballon re protocol on fundamental principles, venue problem	
Enhancer							
Legitimiser	UN; entire observer group	Rabbani	UN; entire observer group		Iran		UN; entire observer group
Monitor							
Guarantor							Piriz-Ballon
Enforcer							Russia
Reconciler				Inter-Tajik Dialogue X		Inter-Tajik Dialogue X	Inter-Tajik Dialogue X
Inducer			Nazarbayev; Karimov				
Neutral messenger						Piriz-Ballon, Boutros-Ghali, Silovic, Riza (UN) re protocol on fundamental principles, venue problem	
Unofficial convener /facilitator				Inter-Tajik Dialogue (12th meeting) X		Inter-Tajik Dialogue (13th meeting) X	Inter-Tajik Dialogue (14th meeting) X



	01/96	01-2/96 (Second phase of fifth round in Ashgabat)	02-5/96	07/96 (Third phase of fifth round in Ashgabat)	09/96	10/96 (Working meeting in Tehran)	12/96 (Rakhmonov-Nuri summit in Khusdeh)	12/96 (Rakhmonov Nuri summit in Moscow)
Explorer (reassurer)								
Convener		Niyazov, Shikhmuradov; Piriz-Ballon		Niyazov, Shikhmuradov; Merrem		Iran; Merrem	Rabbani, Massoud; Merrem	Pastukhov (Russia); Merrem
Decoupler								
Unifier								
Enskiller								
Facilitator		Niyazov, Shikhmuradov; Piriz-Ballon; [observers]		Niyazov, Shikhmuradov; Merrem; [observers]	UNMOT re Garm Protocol	Iran; Merrem	Rabbani, Massoud; Merrem	Pastukhov; Merrem; Vaezi; Afghanistan; [observers]
Envisioner (fact finder)		Piriz-Ballon re power sharing		Primakov re power sharing				Pastukhov; Merrem re CNR agreement
Enhancer								
Legitimiser		UN; entire observer group		UN; entire observer group		Iran; Merrem	Rabbani, Massoud; Merrem	UN; entire observer group
Monitor								
Guarantor								
Enforcer								
Reconciler			Inter-Tajik Dialogue			Inter-Tajik Dialogue		
Inducer	Russia; Central Asian states at CIS Moscow summit	Primakov	Velayati, Vaezi; Kittani (UN) re ceasefire extension				Rabbani, Massoud	Pastukhov; Merrem; Goulding; Vaezi; Afghanistan re CNR agreement
Neutral messenger			Merrem (UN) re ceasefire extension					
Unofficial convener /facilitator			Inter-Tajik Dialogue (15th and 16th meetings)			Inter-Tajik Dialogue (17th meeting)		



	01/97 (Sixth round in Tehran)	02/97 (Rakhmonov-Nuri summit in Mashhad)	02-3/97 (Seventh round in Moscow)	03-4/97	04/97 (Eighth round in Tehran)	04/97	05/97 (Rakhmonov-Nuri Summit in Bishkek)	05/97 (Resumed eighth round in Tehran)	06/97 (Rakhmonov-Nuri summit in Moscow)
Explorer (reassurer)									
Convener	Velayati; Merrem	Iran; Merrem	Primakov, Pastukhov; Merrem		Iran; Merrem		Akayev (Kyrgyz); Merrem	UN; Iran	Yeltsin, Primakov; Merrem
Decoupler									
Unifier									
Enskiller									
Facilitator	Velayati; Merrem; [observers] re refugee protocol, composition of CNR	Iran; Merrem	Primakov, Pastukhov; Merrem; [observers] re military protocol		Iran; Merrem; Russia; [observers]		Akayev; Merrem re legalisation of opposition parties	UN; Iran; Russia; [observers]	
Envisioner (fact finder)	Merrem re composition of CNR		Merrem re military protocol		Merrem re legalisation of opposition parties				
Enhancer									
Legitimiser	UN; entire observer group	Iran; Merrem	UN; entire observer group		UN; entire observer group		Akayev; Merrem	UN; entire observer group	Yeltsin, Primakov; UN; entire observer group
Monitor								Contact Group	
Guarantor									
Enforcer				Russia; Central Asian states				Contact Group	
Reconciler		Inter-Tajik Dialogue						Inter-Tajik Dialogue	
Inducer			Primakov, Pastukhov re military protocol	Russia; Central Asian states	Iran; Russia re continuation of talks	Yeltsin vis-à-vis Rakhmonov			
Neutral messenger									
Unofficial convener /facilitator		Inter-Tajik Dialogue (18th meeting)						Inter-Tajik Dialogue (19th meeting)	